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Abstract 
On November 27, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Drug Quality Security Act (DQSA). Title II of the DQSA, the Drug Supply 
Chain Security Act (DSCSA), replaces all existing or future state-wide drug track or trace systems with a new federal drug tracing 
program that uses pedigrees and product identifiers for verification of the drugs being accepted by the buyer. While the full 
implementation of the DSCSA is projected to take about ten years from its enactment, both the implementation framework and 
milestones of the new federal tracing program have been carefully laid out. In this essay, we will explore the current state of the U.S. 
pharmaceutical supply chain and the imperatives behind the DSCSA. At the crux of this essay is an analysis of the DSCSA implementation 
plan, its challenges according to feedback from stakeholders, and its potential effectiveness against the entrance of substandard and 
counterfeit drugs into the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain. 
Keywords: Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) 
 
Introduction 
Since the enactment of the Prescription Drug Marketing Act 
(PDMA) of 1987, the federal and state governments have tried 
to combat counterfeit drugs from entering the United States 
and the state’s pharmaceutical supply chain. A noteworthy 
attempt to prevent counterfeit drugs from entering the state 
drug supply chain was the California E-Pedigree drug tracing 
program that was passed in 2004 and was to be implemented 
by the end of 20171. Since all of the states had been using 
paper format pedigree systems, California E-Pedigree would 
have been the first electronic pedigree system.  
 
However, California’s e-pedigree provisions came to a halt2. 
On November 27, 2013, President Obama signed into law the 
Drug Quality Security Act (DQSA). Title II of the DQSA, the Drug 
Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA), removes from all states all 
existing or future drug track or trace systems, including 
pedigree systems. The DSCSA replaces those systems with a 
new federal drug tracing program that uses pedigrees and 
product identifiers for verification of the drugs being accepted 
by the buyer. While the full implementation of the DSCSA is 
projected to take about ten years from its enactment3, both 
the implementation framework and milestones of the new 
federal tracing program have been carefully laid out4. In this 
essay, we will explore the current state of the U.S. 
pharmaceutical supply chain and the imperatives behind the 
DSCSA. At the crux of this essay is an analysis of the DSCSA 
implementation plan, its challenges according to feedback 
from stakeholders, and its potential effectiveness against the 
entrance of substandard and counterfeit drugs into the U.S. 
pharmaceutical supply chain. 
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I. Why Now? The Current State of the U.S. Pharmaceutical 
Supply Chain and the Imperatives to Track and Trace 
Counterfeit5 and Substandard6 Medicines 
In 2007, U.S. health officials became alarmed by reports of 
unexpected allergic-type reactions in patients undergoing 
dialysis treatment.7 The reactions were linked to a widely used 
anticoagulant — heparin8 — and specifically to an adulterant 
that had been introduced during manufacture of the drug in 
China, which were tested and distributed in the U.S. by Baxter 
International Inc.9,10 By May 2008, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) received 149 reported deaths related to 
heparin11. The FDA indicates the adulteration of heparin was 
an economically motivated act12,10—  a deliberate breach of 
the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain13. While outraging the 
public, the heparin recall was only one of 203 FDA drug recalls 
in 200814.  
Before diving deeper into the heparin adulteration case, let’s 
take a look at the current U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain. In 
the 21st century, drug manufacturing and distribution have 
become increasingly complex. Prescription and over-the-
counter medications come from factories all over the world, 
moving into the American marketplace through supply chains 
that can involve numerous processing plants, manufacturers, 
suppliers, brokers, packagers, and distributors. The number of 
drug products made at non-U.S. sites doubled between 2001 
and 2008, according to FDA estimates.15 An estimated 40 
percent of finished drugs used in the United States are made 
abroad, and 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients used in U.S. drugs originate from foreign 
countries.16 The pathway of the pharmaceutical supply chain 
— from raw materials, to active ingredients, to initially 
processed products, to finished products, to repackaged 
products, finally to patient delivery — is inherently complex, 
and every step is an opportunity for adulteration (see Figure 1, 
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produced by the Pew Health Group17). Moreover, the potential 
for counterfeit or substandard medicines to enter the system 
and reach patients has heightened due to globalization, the 
complexity of pharmaceutical distribution, and the existence 
of criminal actors taking advantage of supply chain 
weaknesses.  
 
 
 
The factors that encourage the proliferation of substandard 
and counterfeit medicines are different but overlapping. 
Typically, the neglect of good manufacturing practices, 
whether accidental or deliberate, drives the distribution of 
substandard drugs, whereas falsified or counterfeited 
medicines are rooted from crime and corruption. Both types 
are able to circulate and remain in the pharmaceutical supply 
chain because of the unpredictable supply, constant demand 
for medicines, and the weaknesses in the regulatory system. 
 
There is a significant financial incentive to produce poor-
quality or fake prescriptions, whereas the penalties and odds 
of getting caught are low in comparison. The Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) penalizes adulteration, 
misbranding, and counterfeiting at a maximum of $10,000 or 
three years in prison18. On the other hand, the penalties for 
trafficking drugs such as heroin and cocaine can have jail 
sentences up to life and fines in the millions of dollars19. The 
penalties related to falsified medicines may be too low to deter 
violations and crime, particularly for pharmaceutical 
counterfeiting, which is additionally incentivized by high 
profitability. Based on an estimate by the Department of 
Commerce, a $1,000 investment in counterfeit prescription 
drugs could yield up to a $30,000 return, which is 10 times 
greater than that of the sale of illegal narcotics20. 
 
In the case of the heparin adulteration mentioned previously, 
a shortage of raw ingredient provided a motivation for 
deliberate substitutions of cheaper materials. The adulterant, 
oversulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), entered the supply 
chain at a time when a widespread swine virus outbreak had 
greatly diminished Chinese pig herds in 200721. Since crude 
heparin was (and still is) commonly extracted from pig 
intestines22, the increase in the price of pigs led to an increase 
in the price of crude heparin23. OSCS, a synthetic material 
costing nearly 100 times less to produce than actual heparin24 
and mimicking some of heparin’s chemical properties25, was 
not detected as an adulterant by standard assays or by 
additional tests used by Baxter26. However, during several 
retroactive investigations, OSCS was identified in the finished 
heparin active ingredient made in China by Scientific Protein 
Laboratories–Changzhou (SPL-CZ) as well as in the crude 
material provided to SPL-CZ from consolidators.27 This 
evidence suggests that the OSCS was introduced upstream of 
SPL-CZ.  
 
However, in the aftermath of the heparin scandal, when Baxter 
and the FDA sent their own inspectors to evaluate the supply 
chain, they were repeatedly denied access to investigate 
upstream workshops and consolidators who are not registered 
by the FDA.28 Hence, the identities of the perpetrators in the 
first heparin recall remained unknown, although ample 
evidence was available to help pinpoint them. More 
importantly, the case revealed the need for faster regulatory 
action, improved communication between different branches 
of FDA, more collaboration with regulatory authorities outside 
of the US, and greater vigilance within the industry. The FDA 
failed to take immediate action or issue import alerts to 
prevent products from these suspicious sites from entering the 
United States. It was not until five years after the heparin 
scandal, in 2013, that the FDA finally published a guidance 
recommending practices for monitoring the quality of crude 
heparin29, and the U.S. Pharmacopoeia (USP) updated the 
heparin quality standards meant to boost the safety and 
quality of the drug.30  
Responses from the drug suppliers and regulators could have 
been more swift and deliberate had there been a track-and-
trace system that registers all of the manufacturers, 
distributors, repackagers, and distributors as a pharmaceutical 
product moves through the supply chain. Furthermore, a 
verifiable and secure electronic track-and-trace system that 
includes every member of the supply chain would enhance the 
level of responsibility, accountability, and transparency 
between all supply chain participants and improve the security 
of the drug supply. This is the system that the Drug Supply 
Chain Security Act (DSCSA) aims to build31. 
II. DSCSA: Implementation Framework and Progress 
Enacted in 2013, the DSCSA delineates critical steps to build an 
electronic, interoperable system to identify and trace most 
human prescription drugs32 throughout their distribution 
process in the U.S. by 2023. Drug manufacturers, wholesale 
drug distributors, repackagers, and dispensers (primarily 
pharmacies) will be working in cooperation with the FDA to 
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develop the new system. This law requires the FDA to establish 
standards, issue guidance documents, and develop pilot 
programs to support effective implementation and 
compliance. 
 
There are multiple phases to the law, each adding a layer of 
security around serialization and traceability. The first phase, 
which started on January 1, 2015 and ends on November 26, 
2023, requires supply chain participants share chain-of-
ownership data. The second milestone of DSCSA, starting 
November 2017, requires pharmaceutical manufacturers’ 
products be marked with a product identifier (GS1 Global 
Trade Item Number® (GTIN®) or National Drug Code (NDC)), 
serial number, lot number, and expiration date in both 
machine-readable and human-readable format. The final 
phase of DSCSA requires trading partners share chain-of-
ownership data in a manner that allows for serialized item 
traceability back to the product origin (usually the 
manufacturer). Critical DSCSA implementation dates include: 
 
• Lot-level traceability is already in force and has been 
since 201533; 
• By November 2017, manufacturers must serialize all 
pharmaceutical products34; 
• By November 2023, every stakeholder in the 
distribution of prescription drugs in America, from 
manufacturers to dispensers, must have bought into 
and implemented a system giving electronic 
traceability of each drug package.35 
 
Although there were a few delays within the 2015 deadlines, 
supporters of the DSCSA have reasons to believe that its 
implementation is happening, and that the FDA has been doing 
a good job of meeting the deadlines and engaging stakeholders 
in public meetings, workshops, webinars, and online 
feedbacks. More recently, in October and December of 2016, 
the FDA issued an updated guidance36 on identifying and 
notifying suspect drug products in the drug supply chain. In 
addition, in January 2017, a draft guidance37 on annual 
reporting to the FDA by prescription drug wholesale 
distributors and third-party logistics providers as required 
under the DSCSA. As of April 2017, the FDA has been gathering 
additional public comments and engaging stakeholders to 
prepare for upcoming pilot projects38. Hence, there is still a 
long road ahead for implementation of the DSCSA. 
III. Technical challenges for DSCSA Implementation 
Catalyzed by the DSCSA, the industry-wide serialization, 
aggregation, and verification directive is expected to improve 
traceability of drugs, prevent counterfeit products from 
entering the supply chain, and ultimately improve patient 
safety. However, the process of preparing for the full 
compliance with the law could be time consuming and 
complex. Many stakeholders have expressed further needs to 
clarify requirements for each type of member of the supply 
chain, define the scope for each step of implementation, and 
to define the scope of responsibilities for each party. 
 
Many stakeholders, ranging from Janssen Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. to the American Pharmacists Association (APhA), have 
urged the FDA to evaluate the costs of implementing a 
standard serialized data exchange system while considering 
each player’s different capacity to achieve interoperability and 
effectively communicate with other stakeholders throughout 
the supply chain. While larger companies may have the 
resources to deal with the financial demands of serialization, 
smaller and medium-sized companies and healthcare 
institutions may find implementation more challenging or 
cost-prohibitive. In particular, APhA expresses concerns that 
“if systems are implemented that are not interoperable with 
existing pharmacy systems, then trading partners will stop or 
limit transactions with pharmacies that cannot readily adopt 
serialized data exchange systems, increasing costs, limiting 
patient access and potentially driving dispensers out of 
business. Rural pharmacies that lack or have slow internet 
connections are especially vulnerable to such exclusion from 
trading partners”39. On the other hand, companies that do 
manage to introduce new serialization technology in time for 
the deadlines may also risk disruption to their product supply 
if they experience technical issues and downtime as a result of 
the new process. According to Janssen, “the cost and time to 
implement serialization and aggregation on an existing 
packaging line varies widely and is dependent upon several 
variables, including, age of the line and current technology, 
number of SKUs packaged on the line, and number of markets 
served by that line. Time to retrofit a line with serialization 
requires approximately 50% less time and costs approximately 
70% less money than to retrofit a line with both serialization 
and aggregation… Data gathered to date have revealed some 
loss of productivity; however, we have been able to recover 
some of the loss.”40.  
 
Several stakeholders have pointed out vague terms and scopes 
of responsibilities as described in the law as well as guidance 
documents published by the FDA. For example, the process of 
identifying and reporting an illegitimate drug product is 
confusing for many members of the supply chain. On the 
dispensing side, APhA’s constituents, most of whom are 
pharmacists, want more education on the identification and 
determination of illegitimate products in order to best protect 
the integrity of the supply chain.41 Hence, APhA encourages 
the FDA to educate pharmacists on the identification and 
reporting of illegitimate products. Furthermore, the guidance 
does not specify what each member of the supply chain is 
legally required to do when they suspect a drug product is 
illegitimate. On the distribution side, both the Healthcare 
Distribution Alliance (HDA)42 and the Pharmaceutical 
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Distribution Security Alliance (PDSA)43 indicate that the FDA’s 
guidance should be revised to explicitly instruct trading 
partners to contact the relevant manufacturer to determine 
whether a product is illegitimate. The FDA should also clarify 
that the party who makes the illegitimate product 
determination – which will usually be the manufacturer – is 
also the party who is responsible for notifying the Agency of 
the illegitimate product. Without such clarification, multiple 
members would submit their own notifications for the same 
illegitimate product, which would result in confusion for the 
FDA, overload the response system, and delay targeted 
investigations. 
 
External factors may also hamper effective implementation of 
DSCSA in the U.S. if neighboring countries, such as Canada and 
Mexico, do not move in parallel with the U.S. regarding supply 
chain regulation. The lack of a unified global standard may 
result in a challenging transition. Studies have shown that most 
pharmaceutical counterfeits arrive in the U.S. through borders. 
For example, in response to high prescription drug prices in the 
U.S., several services have attempted to make prescription 
drugs available directly from Canadian pharmacies, which 
often can sell the drugs at a significantly cheaper price. 
Government controls make prices 20-80% lower than in the 
United States44. Normally, a patient must have his physician 
become directly involved in this process in order to import the 
drugs from Canada. Although it is understandable for a 
physician to want to help a patient in this manner, there are 
several potential risks for a physician in the U.S. participating 
in these programs. In addition, there is a significant risk that 
the patient may not be getting the drugs prescribed. An 
estimated one to two million Americans buy prescription drugs 
from abroad. Although drugs account for only 10% of 
healthcare costs, the amount has doubled since 1980 and drug 
prices have tripled 45. 
 
With the increased commerce on the Internet comes 
increased risk for users. While searching for health information 
online, consumers are offered advice about prescription 
medications, exposed to drug advertisements, and given links 
to websites that sell medications. Access, convenience, and 
privacy are potential benefits of internet pharmacies for the 
consumer. Internet pharmacies increase access to drugs for 
those that are disabled or otherwise homebound. Some 
proponents of internet pharmacies claim that paper 
prescriptions are often poorly written with illegible 
handwriting, contain wrong dosages, and may be 
inappropriate medications. Proponents further claim that e-
prescribing can often avoid these errors and save millions of 
dollars in health care costs. There are also many concerns and 
risks associated with internet pharmacies, most importantly, 
those related to using the internet as a means of bypassing the 
usual regulatory systems. In fact, Bessell and colleagues found 
that even with tighter standards in many countries, consumers 
are still at risk for problems when buying nonprescription 
drugs from internet pharmacies since balanced information 
about the medications may not be presented.46 
 
IV. The Next Step: Learning from DSCSA-Compliance Pilots 
Since the FDA has yet to determined a unifying set of standards 
for the track-and-trace data exchange format across the supply 
chain, stakeholders have urged the FDA to encourage the 
industry stakeholders to conduct pilots, and then select the 
track-and-trace data exchange models and formats that work 
across the supply chain. At the early stage, many stakeholders 
suggest that the new DSCSA-compliant standards would most 
likely be conforming to GS1 industry standards.  
 
Many groups have already proactively conducted their own 
pilots that help to inform and prepare themselves for DSCSA 
requirements. For instance, the National Coalition of 
Pharmaceutical Distributors (NCPD), which represents 
specialty and independent pharmaceutical distributors, 
reports that its member companies “are increasingly adopting 
technology-intensive methods for processing and forwarding 
T3 information to and from their supply chain partners”.47 In 
addition, having collaborated with the GS1 organization on a 
pilot project, Janssen suggests that the FDA should “continue 
to encourage and sponsor pilots to test the verification of the 
product identifier at various points in the supply chain, not just 
to authenticate returns.”48 According to Janssen, the FDA 
should learn from experiences from other countries that have 
implemented track-and-trace system, specifically, Turkey and 
Argentina. 
 
Currently, the DSCSA-compliance pilot that multiple 
stakeholders have mentioned repeatedly is the Serialized 
Returns Pilot (also referred to as “2019 Pilot”) conducted by 
the Healthcare Distribution Management Association (HDMA). 
The HDMA 2019 Serialized Returns Pilot aims to investigate 
different methods for verifying product identifiers, and to 
identify the most efficient methods for managing the 
verification process for returns to meet the DSCSA 
requirements effective on November 27, 2019. The McKesson 
Corporation, the largest distributor of pharmaceuticals in the 
U.S., is optimistic that “the 2019 Pilot will provide significant 
learnings that are broad enough to inform the 2023 Pilot 
development and DSCSA compliance requirements.”49 
In its public comment toward the FDA, however, the HDMA 
recommends the FDA to further clarify and come to consensus 
with stakeholders on DSCSA terminologies and responsibilities 
for all trading partners in order to build pilots that are based 
upon a common understanding of the statute’s 
requirements.50 HDMA also advocates for tailoring any FDA-
sponsored pilots narrowly (without venturing into testing what 
the DSCSA does not require) and not seek to impose what the 
DSCSA does not require.51 The comment from HDMA suggests 
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that the implementation of the DSCSA is still at a vague stage 
and is desperately in need of further clarification as pilots 
program are being conducted. 
V. How Effective will the DSCSA be in the Fight against 
Falsified Prescription Drugs? 
This discussion will focus on the whether the DSCSA basic 
design can prevent counterfeit drugs from entering the U.S. 
pharmaceutical supply chain (USPSC). Using cases of 
counterfeit drugs entering the USPSC in the past, we examine 
how the DSCSA will affect those examples of counterfeit drugs 
entering the USPSC. 
 
The scope of the DSCSA only covers the pharmaceutical supply 
chain within the U.S. and does not cover the counterfeit active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) coming from overseas. 
However, current FDA rules require that only FDA-approved 
businesses can make API for U.S. manufacturers52. As was 
determined in the heparin case in section I, it was at the 
tertiary level of suppliers where the counterfeit ingredients 
were introduced into the heparin API. Hence, the heparin 
contamination crisis, delayed regulatory response, and 
subsequent dead-end investigations would have been 
preempted had there been a combination of the existing FDA 
requirements and a track-and-trace system under the DSCSA. 
 
Here, we consider trading partners as the basic components of 
the DSCSA supply chain model. The DSCSA defines who trading 
partners are: manufacturers, wholesale distributors, third 
party logistics providers, repackagers, and dispensers. All of 
these trading partners have to be authorized according to the 
DSCSA53. To be authorized, they must be licensed by the state 
or by the FDA. In addition, the owner of a distributor must be 
without a felony conviction related to the USPSC54. The rules 
of dealing with only authorized trading partners would prevent 
counterfeit drugs from entering the USPSC. The requirement 
of only dealing with authorized trading partners and owners 
without certain convictions makes the USPSC a closed system. 
However, as we will discuss in the next sub-sections, it does 
not completely stop a dishonest trading partner from getting 
an API or drug from an unauthorized third party. We will focus 
our discussion on three of the major trading partners in the 
DSCSA supply chain in sequence: manufacturers, wholesale 
distributors, and dispensers. 
 
a. Manufacturers 
In the 1990s, Biochimica Opos SpA, an Italian pharmaceutical 
manufacturer owned by the French drug company Roussel-
Uclaf S.A., falsified records to conceal its use of unauthorized 
manufacturing plants in Italy, France, and Romania to produce 
the antibiotic cefaclor. Cefaclor was eventually recalled and 
Biochimica Opos withdrew its approved marketing 
applications55. In 2001, the mother company, Roussel-Uclaf, 
pleaded guilty to felony charges of conspiracy and defrauding 
the FDA. Roussel-Uclaf was ordered to pay $33 million, $10 
million in proceeds and $23 million as a criminal fine, to the 
U.S. government. Roussel-Uclaf also pleaded guilty on a two-
count indictment charge for selling an adulterated drug in the 
U.S. market in 1995 and 1996 via Biochimica Opos56. The case 
represents the first time a foreign corporation making a drug 
product entirely outside the United States received a criminal 
punishment for defrauding the FDA57. 
 
Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals Inc. was FDA approved to 
manufacture and import drugs into the United States. 
However, the Ranbaxy's manufacturing plants in India had 
been selling Guaifenesin LA Tablets 600 mg extended release 
product in the U.S. without FDA approval in 200258. In 2008, 
the Department of Justice subpoena motion claimed that 
Ranbaxy had used API from unapproved FDA sites. On 
February 25, 2009, the FDA prohibited Ranbaxy's APIs and 
finished products from three manufacturing plants from 
entering the U.S. market. Ranbaxy failed to produce drugs 
within Good Manufacturing Standards and was found guilty of 
selling adulterated drugs in the U.S. in 2013, given a fine of 
$150 million, and had to pay $350 million in claims for a total 
of $500 million59. On September 16, 2013, an FDA import alert 
was given for Ranbaxy's Mohali manufacturing plant which 
prohibits its drug products from entering the U.S. market60. On 
January 23, 2014, the FDA prohibited yet another Ranbaxy's 
plant in Toansa from manufacturing and distributing APIs for 
the U.S. market61. 
 
Although the above examples are worst case scenarios, every 
year the FDA issues warning letters for not following good 
manufacturing practices and adulteration of API as well as 
finished pharmaceutical goods in the U.S. and abroad.62 If the 
manufacturers of API and finished pharmaceutical products 
only deal with authorized trading partners, many of these 
severe problems of adulterated drugs will not occur. However, 
in the case of Ranbaxy, it is the culture of the company that 
has to change. 
 
b. Wholesale Distributors 
Corrupt wholesale distributors have made millions of dollars 
from buying off the gray market and from secondary suppliers 
that bought their drugs from non-FDA authorized companies. 
In 2000 and 2001, Dutchess Business Services, a drug 
wholesaler licensed in Nevada, and Legend Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., bought counterfeit Serostim (a drug used to treat 
excessive weight loss in AIDS patients) and later sold it to 
McKesson Corp., which then sold it to retail pharmacies63. In 
addition, Dutchess and Legend were found guilty of doing 
business with Florida and South Carolina drug wholesale 
distributor companies that were not authorized to possess the 
drugs involved in the transactions64. The person that sold the 
counterfeit drug, Serostim, to the Florida drug wholesale 
company, Crystal Coast, who sold it to Dutchess, had been 
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operating a drug wholesale business without license in the 
state of Florida. Although Florida and Nevada have pedigree 
laws on the buying and selling of drugs in their states, Dutchess 
and Legend failed to get and properly maintain appropriate 
pedigree records from their sellers and provide adequate and 
correct pedigree information to their buyers. The Nevada 
Board of Pharmacy fined Dutchess $1,000 for each of 399 
counts and $250 for each of the remaining 483 counts for a 
total fine of $519,750 65. Legend was assessed a fine of $250 
for each of 125 counts for a total of $31,250 66. Unsurprisingly, 
Dutchess and Legend lost their wholesale distributor licenses 
in Nevada. 
 
One of states that seemed to have a problem with wholesale 
distributors selling diverted and/or counterfeit drugs was 
Florida. Florida had a pedigree system that was required for 
secondary wholesalers but it was not enforced 67. On July 21, 
2003, nineteen people were indicted for selling counterfeit 
drugs 68. Eighteen were indicted for a variety of charges from 
racketeering, conspiracy, and other offenses in regards to 
prescription drug fraud. A grand jury was convened in 2003 
and concluded that the Florida wholesale pharmaceutical 
industry had become corrupt due to criminal elements 69. 
Some Florida drug wholesalers who had been given licenses to 
operate in Florida had one or more felony convictions 70.  
 
Alarmingly, many of those Florida drug wholesalers did not 
have the proper training or experience to handle, store, or deal 
in pharmaceuticals71. Moreover, according to the grand jury 
report, corrupt secondary wholesalers in Florida had done 
business with millions of dollars of prescription drugs that 
were later to be found as counterfeits72. Counterfeiters used 
relabeling, dilution, substitution, and overstating the potency 
techniques when counterfeiting the drugs. 
 
In 2012, there were two cases that resulted in over a billion 
dollars in fraud due to drug diversion that covered multiple 
states where 71 people and three corporations were 
charged73. Drugs that were dispensed to Medicaid patients 
were diverted and resold back to corrupt wholesalers, who 
then sold the drugs to pharmacies. The drug diversion 
occurred from 2007 until 2011, and although fraudulent drug 
pedigrees were supplied, it was impossible for the chain and 
independent pharmacies to trace a pedigree to determine a 
place of origin 74. 
 
In the cases discussed above, the indicted wholesale 
distributors were willing to cut corners to gain profits, resulting 
in injuries or deaths for many patients. In most cases, dealing 
only with authorized trade partners will prevent the 
introduction of counterfeit drugs into the USPSC. In the DSCSA, 
verification is not only with the seller but with the 
manufacturer or repackager. In a Nevada case of counterfeit 
drugs, it was not until the manufacturer was contacted before 
it was determined by the lot number that the drugs were 
counterfeit75. Furthermore, by contacting the manufacturer, a 
determination on whether the seller is authorized to sell the 
drug becomes known. The database of authorized wholesale 
distributors, which is maintained by the FDA, will help trading 
partners to determine authorized wholesale distributors. In 
many of these cases given, the main theme was that none of 
the incidences were found through inspections but after the 
fraud was committed and discovered. 
 
c. Dispensers: Pharmacies and Pharmacists 
From time to time, counterfeit, diverted, and diluted drugs can 
and do enter the USPSC via corrupt pharmacies or 
pharmacists. There is a case of a licensed pharmacist buying 
counterfeit drugs, Cialis and Viagra, from China for his 
pharmacy in San Jacinto, Texas76. The special agents of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the FDA 
Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) were involved with this 
purchase by posing as delivery men. The licensed pharmacist 
was sentenced to two years in federal prison without a chance 
of parole. 
 
In 2014, a registered pharmacist, who was also an owner of a 
pharmacy in Des Moines, Iowa, was sentenced to two years in 
federal prison for diverting hundreds of thousands of narcotic 
pain pills from the drugstore. The pharmacist had purchased 
many more hydrocodone pills than the store needed to fill 
legitimate patient prescriptions and sold the excess pills to 
drug abusers. To cover up what he was doing, the pharmacist 
ordered the painkillers from as many as fourteen wholesalers 
at once77. The Iowa Board of Pharmacy indicated that about 
700,000 hydrocodone pills disappeared from the small 
pharmacy over many years, likely starting from more than a 
decade earlier, in 200278. The scheme unraveled in 2011, after 
an admitted drug addict called the Iowa Board of Pharmacy 
and reporting the drug-diversion scheme79. 
 
In Kansas City, MO for ten years, from 1992 to 2002, a 
pharmacist and owner of two pharmacies, Robert Courtney, 
diluted over 98,000 prescriptions written by 400 physicians80. 
Some of the drugs that were diluted were anticancer drugs 
Taxol and Gemzar. The rest is unknown as Robert Courtney’s 
spurious conducts were completed intermittently with no 
records kept. Lawsuits were filed against the pharmaceutical 
companies of Eli Lilly and Myers Squibb which settled out of 
court for $72 million81,82. 
 
The DSCA clearly states that (1) business must be completed 
between authorized trading partners, (2) transaction records 
must be exchange between buyer and seller that goes back in 
history to the manufacturer, and (3) product identifiers are to 
be verified with the manufacturer or repackager. If the 
pharmacy or pharmacist follow those rules, the drugs they sell 
will be authorized and verified successfully throughout the 
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supply chain. However, the DSCA does not cover personal 
criminal acts, which fall under federal and state laws. 
 
The Effects of Adulterated Drugs on U.S. Economy, 
Healthcare, and the Population 
When drugs imported to the United States are not well 
regulated and monitored for efficacy and safety, the economy, 
healthcare system, and the people bear the consequences. 
Heparin contaminated from China led to a surge of death in 
2007 and 2008 due to allergic and hypersensitivity reactions83. 
The heparin was marketed by Baxter International Inc. who 
purchased the pharmaceutical ingredients (API) from 
Changzhou China Scientific Protein Laboratories (SPL-CZ). The 
FDA approved Baxter to purchase from Changzhou without 
inspecting the plant. Adulterated drugs posed dangers to the 
health of the patients and wasted a lot of money, time, and 
effort to track down the source of the adulteration. Globally, 
500 children died from counterfeit cough syrup that was 
tainted with ethylene glycol84. In addition to this, counterfeit 
inhalers for the treatment of pediatric cystic fibrosis was found 
to contain contaminated bacteria that went into the lungs of 
the children that were treated with the counterfeit 
medication. The recent increase in opioid abuse also has 
contributing factors steaming from counterfeit fentanyl. In 
2013 and 2014, more than 700 deaths were attributed to 
fentanyl and fentanyl analogues in the United States. The most 
recent concern is the cluster of unintentional fentanyl 
overdoses because of tablets thought to be “Norco” purchased 
on the street in Northern California 86. Healthcare providers 
are encouraged to report all cases they feel are the result of 
counterfeit medications.   
 
On the economy level, the innovation that drives economic 
growth, research, and U.S. competitiveness in the global 
marketplace were negatively affected by the growth in 
adulterated drugs in U.S. Piracy and counterfeit drugs cost U.S. 
businesses more than $200 billion annually and account for 
the loss of more than 750,000 jobs85. In addition, these drugs 
take away enormous amount of money from people’s income 
and drug companies 84, as well as affecting the environment. 
The seizure and destruction of seized counterfeit drugs can be 
a costly process, creating a considerable waste. Counterfeits 
and piracy drugs could pose a considerable loss to the sale of 
the original products, pulling its price down and could 
potentially lead to a loss of market for the genuine drugs. As 
stated above, the prevalence of adulterated drugs creates a 
disincentive to innovation. The money to be used for R&D by 
some of the pharmaceutical companies has been diverted to 
deter counterfeit drugs. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Although many of the details of the DSCSA are still being 
developed, the DSCSA basic design and requirements 
represent a step in the right direction to reduce the probability 
of counterfeit drugs from entering the U.S. pharmaceutical 
supply chain. The requirement of obtaining drugs only from 
FDA authorized trading partners will help to filter out 
counterfeit drugs from the gray market. Verification of drug 
products at each node of the supply chain can pinpoint 
potential counterfeit drugs at their point of entry. 
Furthermore, the requirement of transaction records as drug 
products move through the supply chain should make it more 
difficult for counterfeit drugs to infiltrate the supply chain. 
While the DSCSA does not completely prevent criminal actions 
or collusions by deceitful manufacturers, wholesale 
distributors, pharmacies, and pharmacists, the new regulation 
does make it harder for their efforts to succeed. Ultimately, 
the FDA and all participants of the supply chain must stay 
constantly vigilant to secure the U.S. pharmaceutical supply 
chain system. 
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